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ABSTRACT 
Moderate or poor reliabilities, worrisome correlation patterns and ambiguous 
dimensionality raise questions about the awareness of consequences scale being a 
valid measure of egoistic, social-altruistic and biospheric value orientations.  These 
results may, however, indicate something else.  An exploratory analysis performed 
on three samples collected from the general public provides evidence for a 
reinterpretation of the scale.  We believe the concepts of egoistic, social and 
biospheric value orientations remain important as a potential explanation of 
behaviour.  However, our results imply that whether people cognitively organise their 
beliefs in this way when considering adverse environmental consequences requires 
a different approach from the current awareness of consequences scale.  The 
evidence shows the current scale must be reinterpreted as a measure of concern 
over the positive and negative consequences of environmental action and inaction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Climate change, biodiversity loss, pollution of air, water and soil, and resource 
shortages are some of the environmental challenges of the 21st Century.  Tackling 
ecological problems implies modifying a range of human behaviours conducted by 
the whole spectrum of societal actors from the individual citizen to corporations and 
governments.  A variety of motives may stimulate or prevent action.  Theoretical 
models can help identify key drivers and obstacles to achieving behavioural change.  
Yet, in order for behavioural models to be policy relevant, they need to provide a 
descriptive account of the interactions between variables and withstand empirical 
testing. 
Some time ago, Heberlein (1981) declared the essential need for research to 
increase understanding of how people cognitively organise beliefs and feelings about 
environmental issues.  A subsequent growth in environmental attitude-behaviour 
research has resulted in the development of several behavioural models (Ajzen, 
1991; Grob, 1995; Homburg and Stolberg, 2006; Ohtomo and Hirose, 2007).  Stern, 
Dietz and Kalof (1993) proposed one of the more sophisticated models.  They 
integrated assumptions made by several other theories into a broader behavioural 
framework of environmental intentions which has since developed into the Value-
Belief-Norm (VBN) model (Stern, 2000; Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano and Kalof, 
1999).  A key aspect of the VBN model is the hypothesised underlying value 
orientations related to the ego, social-altruism and the biosphere (Stern, Dietz and 
Guagnano, 1995a).  These three components of environmental concern are 
expected to be distinguishable although correlated (Stern, Dietz and Kalof, 1993). 
Questionnaires have then been developed to measure beliefs arising from the value 
orientations.  However, the empirical results as to whether such questionnaires 
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demonstrate that people cognitively differentiate between egoistic, social-altruistic 
and biospheric consequences are at best mixed.  Two approaches have been 
employed: the Environmental Concern (EC) scale and the Awareness of 
Consequences (AC) scale.  Table 1 provides some examples of EC and AC 
questionnaire items.  Applications using the EC scale have provided supporting 
evidence that people do cognitively construct positions consistent with the VBN 
model subscales (Hansla, Gamble, Juliusson and Gärling, 2008; Milfont, Duckitt and 
Cameron, 2006; Schultz, 2000, 2001; Schultz, Shriver, Tabanico and Khazian, 2004; 
Snelgar, 2006), while those employing the AC scale have consistently reported poor 
subscale reliabilities, theoretically inconsistent subscale correlations and poor 
dimensionality (Gärling, Fujii, Gärling and Jakobsson, 2003; Hansla et al., 2008; 
Joireman, Lasane, Bennett, Richards and Solaimani, 2001; Stern et al., 1993; Stern, 
Dietz, Kalof and Guagnano, 1995b).  Whether the AC scale is a good measure of the 
three underlying positions has also been questioned (Snelgar, 2006; Spash, 2006), 
but no study has yet investigated the possibility that the AC scale may be measuring 
an alternative cognitive process. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
This paper presents new results questioning whether the AC scale is an appropriate 
measure of the VBN value orientations.  Across two studies, three large samples 
(N=572, 511, 531) were collected from the general public in the United Kingdom 
(UK) as part of on-going work relating to economic valuation of the environment 
using the hypothetical market approach of contingent valuation (Spash, 2000, 2006; 
Spash et al., 2008).  Previously published results from the first study, see Spash 
(2006), were interpreted as consistent with a separation between selfish-altruism, 
where gain to others is of direct benefit to the individual (a perspective common in 
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economics), and social-altruism, where benefiting others is an end in itself.  The AC 
social-altruistic scale can then be seen as a mixture of items from these two 
categories.  The evidence supported the idea of selfish-altruism being related to 
egoism while social-altruism was associated with biospherism, i.e. a two factor 
solution.  This appears to be in broad agreement with Snelgar (2006) who, on the 
basis of a convenience sample, found that the existing AC measures of social-
altruistic concern are more closely allied to the egoistic than to the biospheric, with 
the latter associated with a general type of altruism.  However, Spash found a three 
factor solution and Snelgar that from two to five factors could be derived depending 
upon the analysis employed.  Reanalysis of the Spash study data combined with 
data from a second study has led to the results reported here which move to a 
different perspective on the content and meaning of the AC scale. 
In the next section we describe the VBN model and the role of the AC scale as 
developed in the literature to measure the three value orientations.  Specific items 
behind the scale are discussed and issues arising from published empirical work are 
reported.  Section 3 explores an alternative approach to understanding the results.  
Section 4 describes our data and methods, and Section 5 the results which are 
discussed in Section 6.  Our analysis compares the dimensionality of the three UK 
samples with the rotated component matrix presented by Snelgar (2006).  We 
employ an exploratory analysis so as to remain open to the possibility that the AC 
scale could be measuring an alternative cognitive representation.  We find that such 
a representation is indeed present and can be interpreted as a scale addressing 
concern for negative and positive environmental consequences related to action 
versus inaction. 
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AWARENESS OF CONSEQUENCES: THEORY AND MEASUREMENT 
Stern et al.’s (1993) social psychological model is based on assumptions originating 
in Schwartz’s (1977) Norm Activation Model.  This posited that altruistic behaviour is 
the result of an individual being explicitly aware of the consequences (AC) in terms 
of social harm of not performing a behaviour and that they accept responsibility (AR) 
for the performance of that behaviour.  AC combined with AR increases the 
probability that a person will feel morally obliged to act.  The VBN model extends 
Schwartz’s definition in two ways.  First, the “awareness of harmful consequences” 
construct, which originally described an explicit awareness of consequences, now 
includes beliefs about potential future world states.  For example, an individual may 
believe that “thousands of species will die within the next decade”, which may or may 
not happen.  Second, environmental behaviour is regarded as being the result of 
awareness of adverse consequences affecting (i) oneself, (ii) other humans and (iii) 
non-humans. 
Stern et al. (1993) then proposed three types of value orientations relevant to 
environmentalism: self interest, altruism towards other humans, and altruism towards 
other species and the biosphere2.  These three types of environmental concern have 
been argued to be logically distinct guiding principles (Stern et al., 1999), that can 
only be challenged in terms of desirability or appropriateness (Rokeach, 1973; 
Schwartz, 1992).  The VBN theory posits that value orientation causally influences 
beliefs, because an individual’s values biases them to select and believe in 
information that is congruent with that orientation and to deny value-incongruent 
information (Stern, 2000; Stern et al., 1999).  For example, an active egoistic value 
                                                 
2
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orientation would direct attention towards the subset of outcomes that affect oneself.  
Beliefs are defined as being loosely linked to self-identity, less general and less 
stable than values and challengeable in terms of veracity, while being more general 
and stable than specific attitudes (Stern et al., 1995b).   
While value orientations are argued to causally influence beliefs, people also 
probably learn over time that there are real differences between consequences for 
the self, others and the environment.  Some psychological models of memory are 
compatible with the notion that people form distinctive worldviews.  For example, 
spreading-activation models of semantic memory (Collins and Loftus, 1975; Collins 
and Quillian, 1969; Quillian, 1968) argue that conceptual knowledge is stored as a 
system of propositions organized hierarchically, with some concepts being more 
closely linked together than others. 
So there seems some potential to support the assumption that each of the three 
value orientations could independently influence pro-environmental intentions and 
behaviour (Stern et al., 1995a,b; Stern et al., 1993).  However, whether people 
cognitively differentiate information about general adverse consequences, as 
proposed, is a hypothesis open to empirical investigation.  Social psychologists have 
then administered the EC and AC environmental scales with the goal of measuring 
the distinctive environment concerns proposed by the VBN model. 
The EC scale constructed by Schultz (2000) has produced the most supportive 
results.  The EC scale employs the statement: I am concerned about environmental 
problems because of consequences for ‘______’.  Respondents are then asked to 
rate nouns such as: me, my health, people in the community, future generations, 
plants, trees, whales, etc.  EC studies have reported exploratory and confirmatory 
analyses that verify Stern’s hypothesised factor structure, as well as strong subscale 
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reliabilities and reasonably interpretable correlations between subscales (Hansla et 
al., 2008; Milfont et al., 2006; Schultz, 2000, 2001; Schultz et al., 2004; Snelgar, 
2006).  Such results provide strong evidence that people do differentiate adverse 
environmental consequences as proposed by Stern and colleagues. 
The AC scale has been described as a measure of general beliefs about 
environmental consequences (Stern et al., 1995a).  A set of items on a Likert scale 
measures awareness of consequences relating to each of the egoistic (ACego), 
social (ACsoc),3 and biospheric (ACbio) value orientations.  Table 2 displays 
subscale reliabilities reported by a variety of published studies (Gärling et al., 2003; 
Hansla et al., 2008; Joireman et al., 2001; Snelgar, 2006; Stern et al., 1993; Stern et 
al., 1995b).  These show weak to moderate results.  Early on Stern et al. (1993) 
reasoned that moderate reliabilities might be due to too few items being 
administered.  However, both Gärling et al. (2003) and Hansla et al. (2008) had to 
remove an item from each scale in order to improve reliability, while Joireman et al. 
(2001) reported only moderate reliabilities despite having 4 to 5 item scales.  Most 
studies conclude that a better set of items would improve reliability and that quest is 
undoubtedly in turn responsible for the variety found in published versions of the 
scale. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The several versions of the AC scale (i.e. using different items) have reported an 
assortment of measurement problems.  Various correlation patterns between AC 
subscales indicate the questionnaire might have low construct validity.  Based on the 
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aspect which is the concern for others in society.  As noted in the introduction altruism may be defined 
as self-centred or selfless and therefore can also be associated with the other value orientations. 
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finding by Schwartz (1992), that self-transcendence and self-enhancement scales 
correlate negatively, the argument has been made that ACego should be negatively 
correlated with ACsoc and ACbio.  However, studies have regularly reported positive 
correlations between all AC subscales (Joireman et al., 2001; Snelgar, 2006; Stern 
et al., 1993).  The exception is Hanlsa et al. (2008) who found that administering a 
questionnaire including only negatively framed AC items produced a pattern 
consistent with ACego being negatively correlated with the other two subscales.  Of 
greater concern is the finding that ACego does not correlate positively with the 
Schwartz’s self enhancement scale (Stern et al., 1995b) or the EC egoistic scale 
(Snelgar, 2006). 
Another major problem is the high correlation between subscales.  Subscales have 
been reported to share the same variance as follows: 18.50% – 36.00% for Stern et 
al. (1993), 29.16% – 38.44% for Joireman et al. (2001) and for 8.24% – 14.98% 
Snelgar (2006).  While Stern et al. (1993) foresaw the potential for significant 
correlations between the three AC beliefs, the amount of shared variance is 
worrisome, implying that the subscales are partially measuring another construct. 
There have also been contradictory claims concerning the dimensionality of the AC 
scale.  Snelgar (2006) has criticised studies (Stern et al., 1993; Stern et al., 1995b) 
employing a theta scaling procedure because this avoids dimensionality tests.  There 
is no agreement as to how many dimensions the AC scale measures.  The original 
goal was to assess beliefs relating to the three value orientations.  However, Stern et 
al (1993) take the moderate correlation between the subscales as an indication that 
“value orientations may be part of a single perceptual package” (p.340).  This is 
supported by both Stern et al. (1995a) and Stern et al. (1995b) who found principle 
components analysis yielded a one factor solution.  Spash (2006) found a three 
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factor solution with the first loading most on egoistic and social items, the second on 
social and biospheric, and the third combining all three value orientations.  Snelgar 
(2006) found from two to five factors could be extracted using principal axis factoring 
both with varimax and direct oblimin rotations, and also conducted principal 
component analysis.  She concluded “no clear structure was obtained with any of 
these analyses.  Thus it is not appropriate to attempt to label any of the 
factors/components” (p.91). 
Doubts that the scales accurately measure three distinctive elements has led to calls 
for improvement by varying the number of items (Stern et al., 1993) or administering 
negative items only (Hansla et al., 2008).  However, Snelgar (2006), who presents a 
thorough investigation of the measurement properties of the AC questionnaire, 
provides the most negative prognosis concluding that the EC scale is a better 
instrument and should be used in preference to the AC scale.  There is, however, 
another possible interpretation of the scale to which we turn next.  That is the AC 
items may be cognitively categorised using a criteria fundamentally different to the 
VBN authors’ hypothesised belief systems. 
AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION 
The items in the AC scale seem to combine a variety of aspects.  The basic 
construction of the items is around a cause and a consequence.  The consequence 
is for one of the ‘objects’ or entities relating to the value orientations.  This means 
items are constructed by identifying an environmental problem and associating a 
target.  For example, a biospheric item might be related to the problem of tropical 
deforestation with the consequences being for the Earth as a whole i.e. “Tropical 
rainforests are essential to maintaining a healthy planet Earth”.  In addition, wording 
is generally kept simple and there appears a desire for some variety of positively and 
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negatively phrased questions on each AC category to construct the overall scale.  
Yet, within this structure alternative interpretations seem to arise and the task facing 
a respondent may involve unforseen complexities.  For example, as noted earlier, 
the social ‘object’ has been associated with altruism, but altruism can be motivated 
from selfish or selfless interest, and altruistic motives have also been associated with 
concern for the biosphere (Snelgar, 2006; Stern et al., 1993; Stern et al., 1995b).  In 
addition, outcomes which are hard to classify seem to arise.  For example, Spash 
(2006) found a third factor combining equal loadings across all three value 
orientations.  This was interpreted as “an anti-environmental sentiment or lack of 
worry over possible environmental problems and a concern about the potential 
negative personal consequences of environmental protection” (Spash, 2006, p.611).  
The implication drawn being that negative egoistic attitudes failed to form part of the 
egoistic scale and seemed to separate out (Hansla et al., 2008).  The possibility then 
arises that respondents are interpreting the items and clustering them in a totally 
different manner than that expected by the VBN model. 
The heuristic bias literature (Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 
1982; Simon, 1982-1997) indicates that people resort to simplifying rules.  The VBN 
authors agree noting that in many situations, including the response to a survey, 
people use simplifying heuristics (Dietz and Stern, 1995; Stern, 2000; Stern et al., 
1995a).  The VBN model argues that value orientations bias beliefs, which through a 
causal chain of variables ultimately influence behaviour.  In other words, the VBN 
assumes that environmental decision making heuristics are ultimately based on an 
individual’s value orientations.  Gigerenzer and colleagues conceptualise heuristics 
differently, arguing that, rather than being guided by stable and abstract worldviews, 
heuristics are often adapted to the local environment (Gigerenzer, Todd and ABC 
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Research Group, 1999; Marsh, 2002).  If an individual concludes a heuristic is not 
solving a problem, they are able to quickly switch to another type of heuristic, as 
each person is assumed to have a toolbox of simple decision strategies (Tooby and 
Cosmides, 1992).  An individual’s heuristical toolbox might include worldviews and 
value based heuristics, but would also be expected to include other simplifying 
strategies. 
Closed ended questionnaire items must, by definition, frame the issue they address 
in a restrictive way.  That an individual’s response to a questionnaire can be 
dependent upon that framing is well know (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Wang, 
Simons and Bredart, 2001).  Linguistic and cognitive scientists (Croft and Cruse, 
2004; Lakoff, 1987; Pinker, 1998) have noted that some variations of a statement or 
sentence will result in a listener or reader extracting precisely the same meaning, 
while others, with seemingly subtle sentence variations, can result in the recipient 
forming radically different perceptions.  Lakeoff (1987) argued that the meaning of a 
whole sentence is not a compositional function of the meaning of the parts of the 
sentence put together locally.  Instead, the way the sentence is constructed may also 
have meaning.  Hence, to construct an instrument that successfully differentiates 
between the proposed VBN value orientations, it is not enough to design a set of 
items which simply mention egoistic, social or biospheric objects.   Special 
consideration should also be given to the type of response asked of the participants 
and how the items are phrased. 
The EC and AC scales present different types of questions about adverse 
environmental consequences.  Hansla et al. (2008) note that the EC items ask 
participants to evaluate consequences relating to specific attitudinal objects (i.e. self, 
trees, whales), while the AC scale has been described as measuring more the 
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abstract concept of beliefs about general environmental consequences (“Protecting 
the environment will threaten jobs for people like me”; “Environmental protection is 
beneficial for my health”).  The measurement properties of the EC scale show people 
classifying specific attitudinal objects according to the structure proposed by Stern 
and colleagues.  In contrast the reported measurement properties of the AC scale 
imply people are using a different categorisation criterion for general beliefs about 
more abstract objects. 
Previous studies provide some clues for other alternative cognitive processes that 
could account for responses to the AC scale.  As noted, Hansla et al. (2008) found 
that AC subscale correlations demonstrate a different pattern when using only the 
items phrased in terms of negative outcomes.  This suggests respondents may sort bad 
environmental consequences into a distinctive perceptual category and good 
consequences into a separate category.  In addition, Snelgar (2006: 88) has 
commented that: 
“As Stern et al. (1993, 1995) framed the value–belief–norm theory, beliefs that 
the consequences are adverse will result in action.  The beliefs part of the 
theory can also be considered in terms of perceived costs and benefits for 
valued objects.  Behavioural intention will be influenced by the perceived 
costs and benefits of a particular environmental action for each set of valued 
objects, weighted according to the individual’s relative value orientations.” 
The principle component matrix reported by Snelgar (2006) suggests that people 
might differentiate between costs and benefits of not taking environmental action.  
What seems neglected is that individuals might experience cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger, 1957) if they conclude environmental protection is bad for them (as it will 
cost money and time), but good for the environment. 
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Indeed, there is strong empirical evidence that people do cognitively differentiate 
between negative and positive outcomes and are very sensitive as to whether 
statements are framed in terms of positive or negative outcomes, benefits or costs.  
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) suggests that individuals construct 
a reference point and then treat gains differently from losses.  This is supported by 
the endowment effect (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990, 1991) and the 
economic literature comparing willingness to pay for environmental improvements 
versus willingness to accept compensation for environmental damages (Knetsch, 
1994, 2005).  A plethora of framing studies, such as Tversky and Kahneman’s 
(1981) asian disease problem, suggest that choices can depend on whether the task 
is perceive in terms of benefits or costs.  Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1987, 
2000) also posits that people differentiate between the pursuit of gains and the 
avoidance of losses, and employ distinctive strategies to deal with each of these 
situations.  Framing in terms of gains evokes a “promotion-focus” that leads to 
growth related strategies that strive to obtain an ideal goal.  Framing in terms of 
losses can form a “prevention-focus”, resulting in strategies to increase personal 
security in “what ought to be”.  Thus, a set of statements mentioning gains or losses 
may evoke the distinction between promotion or prevention (Semin, Higgins, Gil de 
Montes, Estourget and Valencia, 2005), rather than categories suggested by the AC 
literature. 
Another possible criterion that respondents might employ to categorise AC 
questionnaire items is whether or not the items mention environmental protection 
and so positive action.  Some AC items imply environmental action (eg. 
“environmental protection is beneficial to my health”), while others do not (eg. “the 
effects of pollution on public health are worse than we realise”; “claims that we are 
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changing the climate are exaggerated”).  Anderson (2003) argues the psychological 
literature has often ignored fundamental differences between action and inaction, 
and that, other things being equal, people generally prefer no change.  He refers to 
the principle of “conservation of energy” as an explanation.  For example, the option 
of environmental action may involve inconvenience and monetary losses that are 
less salient under inaction.  A range of psychological literature finds people prefer to 
do nothing as opposed to performing an action eg. status quo bias (Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser, 1988), omission bias (Ritov and Baron, 1990, 1992), inaction inertia 
(Tykocinski, Pittman and Tuttle, 1995) and choice deferral (Dhar, 1996). 
In summary, social psychologists have long been aware that context influences 
perceptions (Brunswik, 1943; Lewin, 1943), and there is strong empirical research 
suggesting people cognitively differentiate between negative outcomes or losses and 
positive outcomes or gains, as well as being sensitive as to whether a proposal 
implies action or inaction. 
DATA AND METHOD 
In order to analyse the issues raised we make use of two data sets collected as part 
of research on the contingent valuation of environmental changes.  Both surveys 
were designed and all related research coordinated by Spash.  In both cases 
respondents were members of the general public in the UK approached at home by 
a market research company employing a stratified random sampling procedure.  The 
research was funded as part of European Community projects (see 
acknowledgments).  The surveys included 13 AC items designed by Stern and 
colleagues taken from the following studies Stern et al. (1993), Guagnano, Dietz and 
Stern (1994), Stern et al. (1995a,b).  In reviewing the literature the number of distinct 
ACbio items was found to be limited to just three and therefore an extra item was 
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designed and added by Spash (Table 3, item ACbio4).  Similarly, Snelgar also 
designed an additional biospheric item (see Table 3, item ACbio5). 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Study 1 
A survey was constructed to assess the maximum willingness to pay of individuals 
for converting a small area of Cambridgeshire farmland into a wetland ecosystem.  
The 713 participants were members of the public from across the UK, with a national 
and regional sample split.  The 45 item questionnaire was verbally administered and 
included questions regarding WTP, ethics and political action.  Socio-economic data 
was also collected.  In total 572 participants completed the 14 AC items shown in 
Table 3.  Participants responded on a 4-point scale (1=strongly disagree; 4=strongly 
agree). 
Study 2 - Random and Non-random Samples 
A survey was conducted to assess the maximum amount people would personally 
be willing to pay each quarter on their electricity bill over the next year to restore 
biodiversity from 14% to 70% in the river Tummel and its surrounding area.  In total 
1069 people participated in the study between July and August 2004.  They were 
residents from the Scottish regions of Inverness, Argyle and Bute, North Ayrshire, 
Highlands, Dumfries and Galloway, Aberdeen, Perth and Kinross, Aberdeenshire, 
Edinburgh and Glasgow.  Participants were verbally administered a questionnaire 
that contained 50 items including the 13 AC items displayed in Table 3.  Also 
included were questions on ethical belief system, general attitudes, socioeconomic 
status and Theory of Planned Behaviour. 
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The overall sample for Study 2 was split by a sequenced and random AC item 
ordering.  The AC items were administered in a sequential order to 528 participants 
of whom 511 answered all the items.  This sub-sample is designated here “non-
random” sample.  The other sub-sample were administered the AC items randomly 
mixed with Theory of Planned Behaviour questions.  In this case of the 541 
participants 531 successfully answered all of the AC items.  This sub-sample we 
designate “random” sample.  For both the “random” and “non-random” samples, 
participants answered the AC using a 7 point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = 
strongly agree). 
The following criteria will be used to assess whether the AC scale demonstrates the 
pattern proposed by Stern and colleagues: (i) bivariate correlations between 
subscales, (ii) reliability and (iii) dimensionality.  Any emergent pattern will be 
assessed using the criteria of (i) interpretability, (ii) correlations between new factors 
and (iii) reliability. 
RESULTS 
Correlations between the subscales proposed by VBN authors are shown in Table 4.  
All of the correlations are large and positive.  Note the correlations between (i) 
egoistic and social subscales, and (ii) egoistic and biospheric subscales are not 
negative.  The subscales share between 21% and 45% of the same variance, which 
suggests that the constructs are partially measuring another construct. 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Theoretical reliabilities were calculated.  Table 5 displays Cronbach’s α for the 
theoretical subscales for each of the three samples.  The social subscale reported 
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reasonably good reliability.  The egoistic and biospheric subscales reported 
moderate and poor reliability respectively. 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Principle components analysis was conducted in the quest for alternative 
interpretable dimensions.  In Table 6 the rotated component matrix from Snelgar’s 
(2006) study and the three samples collected by Spash are presented alongside 
each other.  Snelgar (2006) reported a principle components analysis with varimax 
rotation which we repeated in order to maximise the comparability between the 
studies.  Principle axis factoring with varimax and direct oblimin rotations was also 
conducted and produced a similar structure to the results presented here. 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy is an index for 
comparing the magnitudes of the observed correlation coefficients to the magnitude 
of partial correlation coefficients.  The results were 0.877 for Study 1, 0.880 for Study 
2 non-random and 0.892 for Study 2 random.  These high KMO indexes provide 
evidence that the AC items can be grouped into a smaller set of underlying factors.  
This contradicts Snelgar’s (2006) conclusion that the AC scale has no clear factor 
structure. 
Eigenvalue scores being greater than 1 was the criteria employed to select how 
many components to be extracted from the principle components analysis.  An 
assessment of scree plots confirmed that this approach was suitable.  Study 1 and 
Study 2 non-random were found to have three components, while for Study 2 
random there were two components.  Table 6 reports the rotated loadings obtained 
for the three Spash study samples and the results reported in the Snelgar sample.  
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The rotated components matrix does not illustrate the theoretical structure proposed 
by VBN authors.  For example, in all four samples, Factor 1 contained a mixture of 
egoistic, social and biospheric items.  However, the combined rotated component 
matrix for the four studies does present consistent loading patterns.  There are four 
clusters that consistently load together as shown in Table 7.  Each of these clusters 
can be interpreted in terms of (i) costs and benefits, and (ii) environmental action and 
environmental inaction.  Factor 1 is labelled “Benefits of Action”, Factor 2 is labelled 
“Costs of Action”, Factor 3 is labelled “Benefits of No Action” and Factor 4 is labelled 
“Costs of No Action”. 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
Inspection of the factor loadings in Table 6 indicates that “Benefits of Action” and 
“Costs of Inaction” load on the same factor for the random sample of Study 2 and for 
the Snelgar sample.  These two clusters therefore are taken to form a combined 
factor which we label “Consequences of Environmental Action”.  For all three of the 
samples collected by Spash, the “Costs of Action” items and “Benefits of Inaction” 
items loaded on the same factor.  These items we combine into a factor labelled 
“Consequences of Environmental Inaction”. 
Table 8 displays the bivariate correlations for the newly proposed subscales.  In all 
three samples, “Benefits of Action” and “Costs of Inaction” demonstrated large 
positive correlations, which is consistent with the argument that they be part of the 
larger factor “Consequences of Environmental Action”.  “Costs of Action” and 
“Benefits of Inaction” also demonstrate large positive correlations, which supports 
their combination into the factor “Consequences of Environmental Inaction”.  
“Benefits of Action” correlates negatively with both “Costs of Inaction” and “Benefits 
of Inaction”.  “Costs of Inaction” is moderately correlated with both “Benefits of 
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Inaction” and “Cost of Action”.  While Table 8 displays some large correlations, there 
does seem to be a significant improvement over the AC subscale correlations 
(between 0.672 and 0.459) as presented in Table 4.  The correlations between 
“Consequences of Environmental Inaction” and “Consequences of Environmental 
Action” are much smaller than the correlations between any of the AC subscales. 
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
Table 9 displays Cronbach’s α for the newly proposed subscales.  The “Benefits of 
Action” scale, despite being a combination of egoistic, social and biospheric items, 
demonstrates an excellent reliability coefficient.  The “Costs of Action” has moderate 
reliability, but when combined into the “Consequences of Environmental Action” 
scale once again demonstrates excellent reliability.  The “Costs of Action” subscale 
and the “Benefits of Inaction” subscale possess moderate to low reliabilities, but are 
similar to the reliabilities for the biospheric subscales (see Table 5).  Combining the 
cost and benefit subscales into the “Consequences of Environmental Inaction” 
subscale forms a moderately reliable subscale. 
TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
In summary, the new subscales show three areas of improvement compared to the 
AC subscales.  First, the newly proposed subscales demonstrated superior 
dimensionality.  Second, reliabilities for the “Consequences of Environmental Action” 
subscales are far superior to, while the “Consequences of Environmental Inaction” 
reliabilities are on par with, the AC subscales.  Third, the correlation patterns are 
superior, demonstrating both lower correlations and theoretical consistency. 
DISCUSSION 
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Poor reliabilities, high correlations between subscales and confusing subscale 
correlation patterns have been found for the AC scale.  Rather than using a 
convenience sample as done by others (Joireman et al., 2001; Snelgar, 2006; Stern 
et al., 1993) the AC scale was administered to three large samples that were 
randomly recruited from the general population.  Despite this and some improved 
statistics over other studies the results were broadly similar and the same kind of 
problems commonly found still persisted.  In contrast to previous studies we then 
questioned the AC scale as a measure of the value orientations proposed by VBN 
theory, and investigated an alternative cognitive structure. 
Our exploratory factor analysis shows strong evidence that people do not respond to 
the AC scale as hypothesised in the literature, and instead differentiate between 
environmental action and environmental inaction.  Respondents were also found to 
differentiate between costs and benefits.  Items on environmental action were found 
to demonstrate strong reliability, even though they consisted of a mixture of egoistic, 
social and biospheric statements.  Items implying environmental inaction formed a 
scale demonstrating about the same reliability as the biospheric and egoistic 
subscales.  The relative weakness of this scale is unsurprising given that it arises 
from items designed for a different purpose i.e. to measure AC beliefs.  This means 
items could be adapted and new ones added to the questionnaire to directly address 
action/inaction costs/benefits and so verify the current conclusions. 
These finding also shed light on some of the measurement anomalies in the AC 
scale literature.  Where subscale reliabilities have proven satisfactory this may be 
due to a high proportion of environmental action items.  Thus, the AC social subscale 
has 4 out of the 5 of its items classified into the factor “Consequences of 
Environmental Action” and was found to have higher reliabilities than the other 
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subscales (see Table 7).  The fact that different concepts are being measured than 
those assumed by VBN theory also explains why the AC egoistic subscale has been 
found to be insignificantly correlated with the EC egoistic subscale and Schwartz’s 
self enhancement scale. 
Stern et al. (1993) designed the AC scale in order to test the proposition that people 
cognitively differentiate between egoistic, social and biospheric concerns when 
assessing adverse general environmental consequences.  The VBN model has 
made a major contribution to the environmental attitude-behaviour literate and has 
had some empirical evidence to support it, eg. the EC scale has verified that people 
use the hypothesised cognitive categories.  These models have also provided some 
clear logic as to why environmental beliefs are malleable.  Results from both the AC 
and EC scales indicate the importance of context in forming cognitive 
representations of general environmental consequences.  The EC scale seems to 
work by asking people to assess specific targets of environmental consequence.  
General belief statements under the AC scale, on the other hand, seem to increase 
the salience of information about whether action or inaction is required, and the 
differences between costs and benefits. 
This highlights some of the difficulties involved in researching how people construct 
their beliefs and in particular those about general environmental consequences.  The 
great linguistic philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein once said that “Uttering a word is 
like striking a note on the keyboard of the imagination” (Wittgenstein, 1974).  The 
challenge then is to understand how words play such notes and so form melodies or 
songs. 
Most closed-ended attitudinal questionnaires request participants to summarise their 
opinions, perceptions or beliefs as simplified ordinal responses.  However, 
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summarising beliefs about environmental problems into a simple questionnaire 
response can be a formidable task involving a complex mix of ethical, economic, 
temporal, social and technical issues.  The fact that many people do so happily 
indicates that heuristical strategies cognitively simplify the meaning of questionnaire 
items.  The framing of questionnaire information and items is likely to influence the 
choice of the cognitive strategy used to simplify questionnaire statements.  One 
presentation format may highlight egoistic, social or biospheric components of a 
statement, while a slight alteration may make other aspects of essentially the same 
statement far more salient. 
Heuristical researchers (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman et al., 
1982; Marsh, 2002; Simon, 1982-1997) suggest people use simplifying strategies in 
order to make flexible and timely social decisions.  Some might argue that there are 
endless ways in which people can differentiate environmental beliefs, but there may 
also be a restricted number of commonly employed belief structures.  The current 
study suggests that people can differentiate between costs/benefits, and 
action/inaction.  The decision-making literature has suggested some other examples.  
Various authors have noted that people differentiate between general and specific 
beliefs (Ajzen, 1991; Heberlein, 1981; Stern, 2000; Stern et al., 1999; Stern et al., 
1995a; Stern et al., 1993).  Temporal Construal theorists have noted that there are 
some important differences between how people make judgements about the near 
and distant future (Liberman and Trope, 1998; Trope and Liberman, 2003).  
Evidence exists that people can employ either deontological or utilitarian based 
criteria when making environmental decisions (Spash, 1997, 2006), and in so doing 
employ different cognitive belief structures. 
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The concepts of “ego” and “others” seem fundamental to human psychology and so 
we might expect egoistic and social-biospheric beliefs to also be differentiated and 
be of relevance to concern over environmental consequences.  The EC scale 
supports this hypothesis.  This paper shows only that the work on AC scales is 
misdirected in believing that such concepts are being addressed by the current items 
it employs.  At the same time the scale was found to function as a measure of 
concern over the positive and negative consequences of environmental action and 
inaction.  On the basis of the evidence presented here, improving the scale as a 
measure of these concepts seems worthwhile.  This may then provide a new tool 
useful in its own right and help environmental policy by supplying a new means of 
identifying an additional set of barriers to behavioural change. 
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Table 1.   Example of EC and AC scale items 
Awareness of Consequences Scale Environmental Concern Scale  
Egoistic items 
• Environmental protection will provide 
a better world for me and my children 
 
• Protecting the environment will 
threaten jobs for people like me 
 
Social/Altruistic items 
• Environmental protection will help 
people have a better quality of life 
 
• The effects of pollution on public 
health are worse than we realise 
 
Biospheric items 
• Over the next several decades, 
thousands of species will become 
extinct 
• Claims that current levels of pollution 
are changing earth’s climate are 
exaggerated 
Egoistic items 
I am concerned about environmental 
problems because of the consequence 
for _____ 
• My lifestyle  
• My health 
 
Social/Altruistic items 
I am concerned about environmental 
problems because of the consequence 
for _____ 
• All people 
• People in the community 
 
Biospheric items 
I am concerned about environmental 
problems because of the consequence 
for _____ 
• Birds 
• Plants 
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Table 2.   Published reliability statistics for AC subscales 
 Awareness of Consequences Scales 
 ACego ACsoc  ACbio 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
    
Hansla et al. (2008) .64 
(2 items) 
.56 
(2 items) 
 
.56 
(3 items) 
Snelgar (2006) .30 
(4 items) 
.56 
(5 items) 
 
.46 
(4 items) 
Gärling et al. (2003) .45 
(2 items) 
.42 
(2 items) 
 
.54 
(2 items) 
Joireman et al. (2001) .67 
(4 items) 
.76 
(5 items) 
 
.65 
(4 items) 
Theta Reliability 
    
Stern et al. (1993) .66 
(3 items) 
.62 
(3 items) 
 
.56 
(3 items) 
Stern, Dietz, Kalof et al. (1995) .77 
(2 items) 
.71 
(2 items) 
 
.73 
(4 items) 
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Table 3.  AC scale items in recent studies 
 Administered 
 
Spash 
1 
Spash 
2 
Snelgar 
(2006) 
ACego1: Environmental protection will provide a better world 
for me and my children 
√ √ × 
ACego2:  Environmental protection is beneficial to my health √ √ √ 
ACego3:  Protecting the environment will threaten jobs for 
people like me 
√ √ √ 
ACego4:  Laws to protect the environment limit my choice and 
personal freedoms 
√ √ √ 
ACego5:  A clean environment provides me with better 
opportunities for recreation 
√ √ √ 
ACsoc1:  Environmental protection benefits everyone √ √ √ 
ACsoc2:  Environmental protection will help people have a 
better quality of life 
√ √ √ 
ACsoc3:  We don’t need to worry much about the environment 
because future generations will be better able to 
deal with these problems than we are 
√ √ √ 
ACsoc4:  The effects of pollution on public health are worse 
than we realise 
√ √ √ 
ACsoc5:  Pollution generated here harms people all over the 
earth 
√ √ √ 
ACbio1:  While some local plants and animals may have been 
harmed by environmental degradation, over the 
whole earth there has been little effect  
√ × √ 
ACbio2:  Over the next several decades, thousands of species 
will become extinct 
√ √ √ 
ACbio3:  Claims that current levels of pollution are changing 
earth’s climate are exaggerated 
√ √ √ 
ACbio4:  Tropical rain forests are essential to maintaining a 
healthy planet earth 
√ √ × 
ACbio5:  Modern development threatens wildlife × × √ 
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Table 4.   Study 1 and 2 Pearson bivariate correlations between AC subscales 
 
Egoistic & 
Social 
Egoistic & 
Biospheric 
 Social & 
Biospheric 
Spash Study 1 0.669** 0.570**  0.596** 
Spash Study 2: Non-random 
Sample 
0.672** 0.569**  0.642** 
Spash Study 2: Random Sample 0.662** 0.459**  0.634** 
** p < 0.001 
 
 
Table 5.   Study 1 and 2 Cronbach’s α for AC subscales 
 
Egoistic 
Scale 
 Social Scale  Biospheric Scale 
Spash Study 1 .559  .688  .530 
Spash Study 2: Non-random .603  .715  .521 
Spash Study 2: Random .602  .701  .440 
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Table 6.   Rotated components matrix for Spash and Snelgar studies 
 Factors 
 Spash Studies  Snelgar 
 Study 1  Study 2 Non-Random 
Study 2 
Random 
 Study 2006 
 1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2  1 2 3 
ACego1 .810    .834    .763      
ACego2 .694    .825    .688   .762   
ACego5 .678    .666 .379   .761   .331   
ACsoc1 .590    .755    .731   .554  .384 
ACsoc2 .807    .765    .769   .609 .410  
ACbio4 .586 -.315   .729    .656      
ACego3 
 .664     .719   .691    .740 
ACego4 
 .700     .723   .739    .745 
ACsoc3 
 .639     .609  -.306 .552   .742  
ACbio1  
 .620 -.336          .722  
ACbio3 -.306 .503    -.492 .483   .397   .720  
ACsoc4 .509  .476   .730   .632    .484  
ACsoc5 .330 
 .759  .375 .715   .688   .650   
ACbio2 
 
 .777   .738   .621   .594   
ACbio5     
   
 
  
 .479   
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Table 7.   The items for the four consistent clusters 
Factor 1 – Benefits of Action 
ACego1: Environmental protection will provide a better world for me and my children 
ACego2: Environmental protection is beneficial to my health 
ACego5: A clean environment provides me with better opportunities for recreation 
ACsoc1:  Environmental protection benefits everyone 
ACsoc2:  Environmental protection will help people have a better quality of life 
ACbio4:  Tropical rain forests are essential to maintain a healthy planet earth 
Factor 2 – Costs of Action 
ACego3:  Protecting the environment will threaten jobs for people like me 
ACego4:  Laws to protect the environment limit my choice and personal freedoms 
Factor 3 – Benefits of Inaction 
ACsoc3:  We don’t need to worry much about the environment because future 
generations will be better able to deal with these problems than we are 
ACbio1:  While some local plants and animals may have been harmed by 
environmental degradation, over the whole earth there has been little effect 
ACbio3:  Claims that current levels of pollution are changing earth’s climate are 
exaggerated 
Factor 4 – Costs of Inaction 
ACsoc4:  The effects of pollution on public health are worse than we realise 
ACsoc5:  Pollution generated here harms people all over the earth 
ACbio2:  Over the next several decades, thousands of species will become extinct 
ACbio5:  Modern development threatens wildlife 
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Table 8.   Bivariate correlations for the newly proposed subscales 
 
Spash Studies 
 
Study 1 Study 2: Non-
random 
 Study 2: 
Random 
Benefit of Action & Cost of 
Inaction 
.550** .579**  .610** 
Benefit of Action & Benefit of 
Inaction 
-.414** -.370**  -.385** 
Benefit of Action & Cost of 
Action 
-.172** -.174**  -.144** 
Cost of Inaction & Benefit of 
Inaction 
-.330** -.342**  -.294** 
Cost of Inaction & Cost of 
Action 
-.138* -.059  .021 
Benefit of Inaction & Cost of 
Action 
.466** .360**  .286** 
Consequences of Action & 
Inaction 
-.381** -.330**  -.303** 
** p < .001  * p < .005 
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Table 9.   Cronbach’s α for newly proposed subscales 
 
Spash Studies 
 
Study 1 Study 2: 
Non-random 
Study 2: 
Random 
Benefits of Action .824 
(6 items) 
.891 
(6 items) 
.876 
(6 items) 
Costs of Inaction .671 
(3 items) 
.739 
(3 items) 
.676 
(3 items) 
Consequences of 
Environmental Action 
.841 
(9 items) 
.886 
(9 items) 
.877 
(9 items) 
Benefits of Inaction .539 
(3 items) 
.404 
(2 items) 
.347 
(2 items) 
Costs of Action .437 
(2 items) 
.452 
(2 items) 
.441 
(2 items) 
Consequences of 
Environmental 
Inaction 
.654 
(5 items) 
.563 
(4 items) 
.501 
(4 items) 
 
